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I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no single natural resource on which the world depends more than
freshwater.1 Beyond basic human survival, it is required for food and energy production and is closely related to fundamental national and international interests
such as socio-economic development and national security. Unfortunately, climate
change, depletion of resources, population growth, unequal distribution, and inefficient use all mean that freshwater is rapidly becoming a scarce resource, 2 aptly
named the “Blue Gold.”3 Further fueling the competition over freshwater is the fact
that many of the freshwater resources available for human consumption are not contained within national borders, but are rather unevenly distributed among two or
more states.4 As states strive to take advantage of shared freshwater passing through
their territory, they often disregard or harm the interests of other states and disputes
may arise as a result. Such disputes tend to involve political, economic, legal, and
technical problems;5 they concern a broad spectrum of water-related issues, such as
ownership, allocation, use, and quality; and they may deteriorate into violent conflicts.
While it is often correctly pointed out that interstate disputes over freshwater
have not escalated into a full blown ‘water war’ 6 in thousands of years, it is also
*
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1. Colleen P. Graffy, Water, water, everywhere, Nor any drop to drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions To International Riparian Disputes, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 402, 402 (1998).
2. Id. at 403-405.
3. Pierre Thielbörger, Governing International Watercourses: Implications of the Human Rights to
Water, in WATER LAW AND COOPERATION IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS REGION: A COMPARATIVE AND
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 45 (Aysegül Kibaroglu et al. eds., 2013).
4. These include 276 international river basins and 273 transboundary aquifer systems. WORLD
WATER ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (“WWAP”), THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK, at 31-32 (2012),
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr4-2012/.
5. F.J. Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 INDIAN Y.B. INT’L AFF. 46, 60 (1957).
6. Defined as “interstate violence that involve[s] water specifically as a scarce and/or consumable
resource or as a quantity to be managed.” Juha I. Uitto & Aaron T. Wolf, Water Wars? Geographical
Perspectives: Introduction 168 GEOGRAPHIC J. 289, 289 (2002). The last known “water war” was fought
some 4500 years ago between the ancient Mesopotamian states of Lagash and Umma. Patricia Wouters,
Universal and Regional Approaches to Resolving International Water Disputes: What Lessons Learned
From State Practice?, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING
FROM THE SIXTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR, NOVEMBER 8, 2002, at 112 n.2 (The Int’l Bureau
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration eds., 2003).
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important to note that over 150 water-related conflicts have been recorded between
1900-2010,7 and that 60% of the world’s international river basins currently lack
any type of cooperative management framework that might assist in preventing or
resolving future conflicts.8 Not surprisingly, many political leaders, diplomats, and
scholars predict that freshwater scarcity will lead to violent war in the future, 9 and
in some regions, such as South Asia, assessments have indicated that ‘water wars’
cannot be expected to continue being avoided in perpetuity.10 In short, the fact that
freshwater is rapidly running out while human dependency on it continues to grow
suggests that disputes between states over shared freshwater resources are likely to
arise with increasing frequency and that attention must be paid to their peaceful and
effective resolution. Such attention is necessary since “[w]ater is one of the few
scarce resources for which there is no substitute, over which there is poorly developed international law.”11
Indeed, even though the core principles of international water law12 are commonly viewed as forming part of customary international law,13 their interpretation
remains controversial14 and the main multilateral treaty codifying them has failed

7. Peter H. Gleick & Matthew Heberger, Water Conflict Chronology, in 7 THE WORLD’S WATER:
THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 175-214 (2011).
8. WWAP, supra note 4, at 32.
9. See, e.g., GRAFFY, supra note 1, at 401 n.13, (managing of freshwater is “the single greatest environmental challenge facing the international community.”) (quoting PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 365 (1995)). See also GRAFFY, supra note 1, at 408 n.62 (referring to quotes by Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of the World Bank that “the wars of the next
century will be about water,” and by Boutros Boutros Ghali that “the next war in the Middle East would
be over [water], not politics.”); Stephen C. McCaffrey, If Water Respects No Political Boundaries, Does
Politics Respect Transboundary Waters?, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. & PROC. 353, 353 (2008). “[T]he
only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water,” Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Water, Conflict, and
Cooperation: Lessons From the Nile River Basin, 4 NAVIGATING PEACE, Jan. 2007, at 1,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NavigatingPeaceIssuePKM.pdf (quoting Anwar Saddat). See also Kofi Annan, Sec’y Gen., U.N., Address at the 97th Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Geographers (Mar. 1, 2001) (transcript available at https://iguwater.wordpress.com/news/speech-of-mr-kofi-annan-general-secretary-of-the-united-nations-during-the-97thmeeting-of-the-association-of-american-geographers/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2016)) (“[F]ierce competition for fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in the future.”).
10. MAJORITY STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., AVOIDING WATER
WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 12 (Comm. Print 2011), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senate%20Print%20112-10%20Avoiding%20Water%20Wars%20Water%20Scarcity%20and%20Central%20Asia%20Afgahnistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf.
11. JEROME DELLI PRISCOLI & AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER
CONFLICTS 1 (2010).
12. This refers to the body of international law governing non-navigational water uses, and should be
distinguished from international law governing navigation, maritime issues, and the High Seas, which is
generally considered to be well-developed. Joseph Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta, Toward Global Law
on Water, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 437, 446 (2008); Salman M.A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the
UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 INT’L
J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 625, 625 (2007).
13. Stephen McCaffrey, International Water Cooperation in the 21st Century: Recent Developments
in the Law of International Watercourses, 118 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 11, 11 (2001).
14. STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 450 (2d ed. 2007).
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to gain wide acceptance.15 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that disputes over freshwater cannot be readily solved by juridical decisions. 16 States are thus reluctant to
submit transboundary freshwater disputes (TFDs) for legal resolution by an international court17 and most often attempt to resolve such disputes by way of bilateral
negotiation or non-binding third-party mechanisms such as mediation, conciliation,
and good offices.18 However, as illustrated by the protracted disputes over the Nile
River in Africa and the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers in Central Asia, for instance, such mechanisms are not always effective in resolving TFDs. 19 Arbitration,20 on the other hand, presents an effective and flexible alternative for the resolution of TFDs and it has long been suggested that “more conscious attention to the
art and science of . . . arbitration can provide useful insights for resolving these
conflicts without recourse to the limited solutions possible in international courts of
law or, worse, the devastating possibility of armed conflict.” 21
This Article sets out to examine the potential for arbitration to be effectively
employed by states in the resolution of TFDs. Part II will describe the unique nature
of TFDs, briefly examine the international law principles governing such disputes
as well as the main mechanisms used for their resolution, and evaluate their adequacy. Part III will suggest a new approach to interstate arbitration, intended to
‘revive’ it in the context of TFD resolution. The first element of this approach calls
for a return to the original purpose and true nature22 of arbitration, which rather than
constituting a purely legal mechanism similar to judicial settlement,23 was intended
to be a more flexible, just, and quasi-diplomatic alternative to it. This view prescribes very different roles to arbitrators, international law, and extra-legal considerations in the resolution of interstate disputes, and places arbitration midway between judicial settlement and non-legal mechanisms on the spectrum of interstate
15. As of 19 December 2016, the UN Watercourses Convention had 16 signatories and 36 parties,
Chapter
XXVII
Environment,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&clang=_en
(last visited Dec. 24, 2016).
16. Edda Kristjánsdóttir, Resolution of Water Disputes: Lessons from the Middle East, in
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA
INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 351, 354 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
17. Lucius Caflisch, Judicial Means for Settling Water Disputes, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 235, 236
(Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
18. Awn S. Al-Khasawneh, Do judicial decisions settle water-related disputes? in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 341, 343 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes,
Christina Leb & Mara Tignino eds., 2013).
19. Marit Brochmann & Paul R. Hensel, The Effectiveness of Negotiations over International River
Claims 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 859 (2011) (showing that negotiation of water disputes is successful only
under certain conditions).
20. International arbitration has been defined as “a means by which international disputes can be definitively resolved, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, by independent, non-governmental decision-makers.” GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1
(2d ed. 2001).
21. Aaron T. Wolf, International Water Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Comparative Analysis, 13
INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 333, 334 (1997).
22. M.C.W. Pinto, Structure, Process, Outcome: Thoughts on the ‘Essence’ of International Arbitration, in THE FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 43, 44 (Sam Muller &
Wim Mijs eds., 1994).
23. Settlement by an international permanent court operating on the basis of predetermined procedural
rules and producing binding decisions based on the applicable rules of international law. Caflisch, supra
note 17, at 236.
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dispute resolution processes, thus making it particularly suitable for the resolution
of TFDs. The second element of the proposed approach sets out to revamp the
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or
the Environment24 of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the original
quasi-diplomatic spirit of arbitration. While the Rules were celebrated as innovative
when first adopted in 2001, they have been scarcely used by states to resolve environmental disputes, and have not been used at all in the TFD context. At the same
time, no other permanent institution or tribunal has been created specifically for the
resolution of TFDs. This Article will argue that the PCA and the Rules continue to
present the greatest potential in this regard, however the Rules should be adapted to
the specific context of TFDs and the quasi-diplomatic nature of arbitration.

II.

INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW, TFDS AND THEIR RESOLUTION

For present purposes, a TFD is a dispute that: 25
1) Occurs between two or more states, including non-contiguous states, concerning an international drainage basin. It therefore does not include water-related
disputes between states and individuals, organizations, or communities (e.g., before
investment or human rights tribunals), domestic disputes between units of federal
countries, or disputes between private individuals or communities;
2) Concerns fresh surface water (e.g., rivers, lakes) and groundwater resources
(e.g., aquifers), but only with respect to four main water utilization issues: (a) allocation (e.g., ownership and sovereignty rights); (b) quantity (e.g., dams and diversions); (c) quality (e.g., pollution); and (d) rights of use (e.g., infrastructure, irrigation, and hydropower). Excluded disputes are those that mainly concern river
boundaries and the ownership of territory in which freshwater is located or of islands, navigation, maritime issues (e.g., offshore waters, maritime boundaries, continental shelves, territorial seas, EEZs, and the High seas), disputes in which water
was used as an instrument of conflict rather than the object of the conflict, and disputes between states concerning claims made on behalf of nationals or companies;
and
3) Exhibits a sufficient level of conflictual interaction between the disputing
states. This is assessed on the basis of the Conflict and Peace Databank’s
(COPDAB) International Co-operation and Conflict Scale, as adapted to water-related disputes.26 Accordingly, ‘disputes’ are not limited to situations involving formal declarations of war or military acts, but include also situations involving

24. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, PCA OPTIONAL RULES FOR ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES
RELATING TO THE ENVIRONMENT AND/OR NATURAL RESOURCES (2001), http://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Disputes-Relating-to-the-Environment-and_or-Natural-Resources.pdf.
25. This definition of a transboundary fresh water dispute is intended to achieve several interrelated
objectives: (a) focus on those disputes that most concern the use of fresh water (rather than the allocation
of territory or water as an instrument of war); (b) focus on those disputes that are most salient to states
and their national interests (rather than the interests of nationals or companies); and (c) focus on the most
complex and contentious disputed issues (rather than those that are governed by relatively clear and
accepted international laws or norms, such as navigation issues).
26. Shira Yoffe et al., Geography of International Water Conflict and Cooperation: Data Sets and
Applications, 40
WATER RESOURCES RES., May 2004, at 11, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2003WR002530/epdf.
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“strong verbal expressions displaying hostility,” “diplomatic-economic hostile actions,” or “political-military hostile actions,” as defined in the COPDAB Scale.27
On the other hand, an interaction, claim, or event is not considered to constitute a
dispute if it is not sufficiently significant and meaningful. Such situations may involve “mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction” and “neutral or
non significant acts for the inter-nation situation” as defined in the COPDAB Scale,
or mere indicators of conflict or potential for conflict. 28
The current legal framework governing the use of shared freshwater and the
resolution of TFDs arising from such use is that of international water law, which
is largely based on the limited territorial sovereignty doctrine.29 This doctrine lies
midway between the more extreme theories of absolute territorial sovereignty, the
“Harmon Doctrine,” according to which a state is entitled to do as it pleases with
waters in its boundaries without regard to its co-riparians, and absolute territorial
integrity, according to which no state sharing a water resource may make any
changes to it that restrict the supply of water to a co-riparian.30 Limited territorial
sovereignty is intended to serve as a “mutual limitation of sovereign rights” 31 and
is based on the two core substantive principles of equitable and reasonable utilization (ERU) and no significant harm (NSH).32
The ERU principle, rooted in the sovereign equality of states,33 is considered
by most water law experts to be the basic, governing principle of international water
law governing non-navigational uses of shared freshwater resources. 34 “It entitles
each basin state to a reasonable and equitable share of water resources for the beneficial uses within its own territory,” 35 so that each state sharing a water resource
has “an equal right to an equitable share of the uses and benefits” of that resource 36
and is under an obligation to “use the watercourse in a manner that is equitable and
reasonable”37 vis-à-vis the other states sharing the resource. Riparians are therefore

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 4.
Id.
See, e.g., Dellapenna & Gupta, supra note 12, at 444-45; MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 141-42.
Id. at 113-14.
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Nile Basin Regime: A Role For Law?, in WATER
RESOURCES PERSPECTIVES: EVALUATION, MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 93, 106 (A.S. Alsharhan & W.W.
Wood eds., 2003).
32. Some view the obligation to protect international watercourses and their ecosystems as an additional substantive principle of international water law governing non-navigational uses. MCCAFFREY,
supra note 14, at 446-62. For present purposes, this principle is considered as falling within the broader
“no harm” principle.
33. Mohammed S. Helal, Sharing Blue Gold: The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Ten Years On, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 337,
342 (2007).
34. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 384. See also, e.g., Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Flavia Rocha Loures,
Still not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention?, 18 REV. EUR. COMP.
& INT’L L. 185, 188 (2009); OWEN MCINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (2007).
35. Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Principles of international water law: creating effective transboundary water resources management, 1 INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE SOC’Y 207, 210 (2009).
36. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 391-92.
37. Stephen McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Present Problems, Future Trends,
in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 113, 114 (Alexandre Charles Kiss & Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin
eds., 1994).
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“bound to act so as to conform with the principle of equity.” 38 However, the practical challenge of determining what constitutes each state’s fair share and what conduct or use should be considered equitable and reasonable under this principle, 39
has yet to be overcome. Therefore, while “the notion of equity has evolved as the
only suitable standard to accommodate all likely factors and circumstances that
must be taken into account when reconciling competing interests,” 40 it has also been
criticized for providing no practical guidelines for water allocation.41
The NSH principle has its roots in states’ general obligation under international
law not to use their territory in such a way as to cause harm to another state. 42 It
thus prohibits states in an international drainage basin to use the watercourses in
their territory in a way that would cause significant harm to other basin states or to
their environment.43 The obligation not to cause such significant transboundary
harm has been articulated in the following terms:
States have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant
to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. 44
Both the ERU and the NSH principles are considered to be fundamental principles of international water law45 and as “two sides of the same coin.”46 Nonetheless, their interrelationship remains controversial 47 and they continue to be viewed
by states as competing, elusive, legally indeterminate, and vague.48 Unless the
38. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 146, (citing PAUL FAUCHILLE, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC (8th ed. 1925)).
39. HILAL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVERS
DISPUTE 136-37 (2002).
40. Alistair Rieu-Clarke & Alexander Lopez, Factors that could limit the effectiveness of the UNWC,
in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 77, 87 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds.,
2013).
41. Owen McIntyre, Utilization of shared international freshwater resources – the meaning and role
of “equity” in international water law, 38 WATER INT’L 112, 112 (2013). For instance, the ERU principle was referenced by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, however its application failed to
resolve the dispute and the Court “essentially deferred the adjustment of the balance between environmental protection and economic development to the parties themselves.” Tim Stephens, International
environmental disputes: to sue or not to sue?, in LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL LAW DISPUTES:
WEIGHING THE OPTIONS 284, 298 (Natalie Klein ed., 2014).
42. Also known as the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas.
43. Rahaman, supra note 35, at 210-11.
44. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
45. Salman M.A. Salman, The Future of International Water Law: Regional Approaches to Shared
Watercourses?, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 907, 918 (Mahnoush Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010); Stephen McCaffrey, The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls,
in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES-ENHANCING COOPERATION AND MANAGING CONFLICT 17, 26-27 (Salman M. A. Salman & Laurence Boisson de Chazournes eds., 1998).
46. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 436.
47. Id. at 450.
48. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 163 (2002); Shlomi Dinar, Assessing
Side-payment and Cost-sharing Patterns in International Water Agreements: The Geographic and Economic Connection, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 412, 415 (2006); Halla Qaddumi, Practical approaches to

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/7

6

Meshel: The Evolution of Interstate Arbitration And The Peaceful Resoluti

No. 2]

Evolution of Interstate Arbitration

367

states sharing a freshwater resource agree on a common interpretation of the international water law principles of ERU and NSH, it is not always clear which of them
should take precedence in the resolution of TFDs and they may be interpreted in
contradictory ways.49 Therefore, applying these principles in the resolution of
TFDs has proven difficult50 and has resulted in their infrequent use by states. 51
This is particularly evident in TFDs between upstream and downstream states,
where, for instance, an upstream state increases its use of the shared waters for hydropower production, which may reduce the water supply to the downstream state
for its agricultural water needs.52 In such a scenario, the upstream state might invoke the ERU principle to protect its interests in the utilization of the shared waters,
while the downstream state might emphasize the NSH principle for the same purpose. Since the main users of transboundary freshwater resources have historically
been downstream states,53 a similar scenario could result from such a state’s continuous development of a shared freshwater resource to the point where it threatens
an upstream state’s reasonable future use. 54 Since these principles are “still too
rudimentary and vague to be able to deal comprehensively and efficiently with the
complexity and subtlety of international water disputes,” states may refrain from
applying them in the resolution of such TFDs and avoid mechanisms that rely on
them, such as judicial settlement.55 At the same time, international water law does
not provide for a specific alternative mechanism that states should use in the resolution of TFDs, and as lex specialis it thus adds little to states’ existing obligation

transboundary water benefit sharing 6 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 292, 2008),
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2576.pdf. See also,
Christine Traversi, The Inadequacies of the 1997 Convention on International Water Courses and 2008
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 453, 476, 481 (2011); Olivia
Odom & Aaron T. Wolf, Institutional resilience and climate variability in international water treaties:
the Jordan River Basin as “proof-of-concept,” 56 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. J. 703, 705 (2011); Malgosia
Fitzmaurice & Gerhard Loibl, Current State of Development in the Law of International Watercourses,
in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 33 (Surya P. Subedi ed., 2005);
B.S. Chimni, A Tale of Two Treaties: The Gange and Mahakali Agreements and the Watercourses Convention, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 63, 102 (Surya P. Subedi ed.,
2005). Some contest this claim, see, e.g., MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 407-408, 436, 445.
49. Marwa Daoudy, Hydro-hegemony and international water law: laying claims to water rights, 10
WATER POLICY 89, 95 (Supp. 2 2008); NAHID ISLAM, THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USE OF
INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: OPTIONS FOR REGIONAL REGIME BUILDING IN ASIA 140, 142 (2010).
50. Daoudy, supra note 49, at 95; ISLAM, supra note 49, at 140, 142.
51. INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 75-76 (Mikiyasu Nakayama ed., 2003);
CHRISTINA LEB, COOPERATION IN THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 104 (2013). One
study examining the inclusion of legal principles in international river agreements has found that “equitable use” as a specific water allocation mechanism was included only in 26% of the agreements surveyed, and that the principle of “avoiding significant harm to other” was included in 27% of the agreements. Ken Conca, Fengshi Wu & Joanne Neukirchen, Swimming Upstream: In Search of a Global
Regime for International Rivers, in GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND
GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING 93, 111 (Ken Conca 2006).
52. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 410.
53. ELVER, supra note 39, at 139.
54. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 412-13; David Grey & Dustin Garrick, Water security, perceptions
and politics: the context for international watercourse negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 37, 46 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb &
Mara Tignino, eds., 2013).
55. Al-Khasawneh, supra note 18, at 341.
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under general international law to resolve disputes peacefully by way of “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”56
In the TFD context,57 the dispute resolution mechanisms most commonly used
by states are bilateral negotiation58 and third-party non-binding mechanisms.59

A.

Bilateral Negotiation

States most often attempt to resolve TFDs by way of bilateral non-binding
mechanisms, and there is a long history of recourse to such mechanisms in the resolution of these disputes.60 The 1911 Madrid Declaration,61 for instance, provided
for the creation of permanent joint commissions for the resolution of water disputes,
and a similar provision was included in the 1923 Geneva Convention,62 1961 Salzburg Resolution,63 and 1966 Helsinki Rules.64 Joint commissions have indeed been
established in relation to many shared freshwater resources. 65 The tendency of states
to resort to bilateral non-binding mechanisms such as joint commissions may in part
be a result of the “vague standards” of international water law, which may cause
states to proceed with negotiations until agreement is reached, rather than enter into
litigation with unpredictable results.66 Bilateral negotiation also allows the parties
to control the process and the outcome; provides a generally simpler and less costly
procedure; and favors a compromise. Moreover, the parties, who are best placed to
develop a workable solution, are themselves responsible for resolving the dispute
and any settlement devised by them is thus more likely to be accepted than an imposed settlement.67
However, bilateral non-binding mechanisms may also prove ineffective in resolving disputes since a negotiated settlement may reflect the parties’ relative negotiating power, it is inherently political and therefore subject to external pressures,
and the parties may not have access to technical expertise required for the resolution
56. U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶ 1.
57. The present discussion concerns only the use of dispute resolution mechanisms in the resolution
of TFDs. While some mechanisms have proven useful in managing shared resource and preventing disputes, they are arguably limited in their ability to resolve TFDs effectively and efficiently once these
have arisen. DELLI PRISCOLI & WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER CONFLICTS 7, 9 (2010).
58. This includes, e.g., bilateral negotiations, consultations, and diplomacy.
59. These include, e.g., mediation, conciliation, good offices, fact-finding, joint institutions or commissions, and any other non-binding process involving a third party, whether a State, organization or an
individual.
60. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Water Disputes Defined: Characteristics and Trends for Resolving Them,
in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: PAPERS EMANATING FROM THE SIXTH PCA
INTERNATIONAL LAW SEMINAR 49, 89 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003);
Caflisch, supra note 17.
61. INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE 206
(Patricia Wouters ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wouters].
62. Geneva Convention Relative to the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting more than One
State and Protocol of Signature, art. 12, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 77.
63. Wouters, supra note 61, at 296.
64. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, in REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION HELD AT HELSINKI, AUGUST 14-20, 1966, at
486, 488 (arts. XXXI-XXXIII) (1967).
65. For a partial list see Wouters, supra note 61, at 119, n.18.
66. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 355.
67. Richard B. Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
471, 477 (1988).
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of a dispute.68 Since negotiations do not always permit the facts to be established
objectively and impartially, 69 they run the risk of a party denying that a dispute
exists, advancing unreasonable claims, or dragging its feet. 70 Negotiation also allows states to opt for extreme positions that may lead to deadlock since it lacks
“efficient restraints” on the negotiating parties, it may last for a long period of time
before reaching a mutually accepted agreement, if any, and it may well end fruitlessly.71 Moreover, the goals of the various parties to a negotiation may not be
achieved as expected and compromises or agreements that were once concluded
through negotiation may not be put into effect in the following years.72 Ultimately,
a variety of factors may impinge on any negotiation, including the parties’ systems
of government, the individual psychology of political leaders, and public opinion. 73
In the context of TFD resolution, negotiation may also prove inadequate to
protect the interests and positions of weaker states in situations of power asymmetry74 and water-hegemony, for instance where the parties have “uneven bargaining powers or unequal legal and technical expertise in the matters involved.” 75
Moreover, where states wish to adopt and apply the principles of international water
law to their dispute, this may prove difficult to do in bilateral negotiations since
“the objective determination of the equitable and reasonable uses of a transboundary watercourse or whether or not a particular project may result in significant harm
to another state is, at best, an unworkable exercise” without the involvement of an
impartial third party.76 This is especially true where the equity and reasonableness
of a water use, as well as the magnitude of the harm, are mere projections. 77 Put
another way,
…in the absence of agreement between the states concerned on what
amounts to an equitable allocation of the uses and benefits of a watercourse, only an impartial third party to whom the question has been entrusted by those states can authoritatively determine whether they are utilizing the waters in an equitable and reasonable manner…even assuming
that [this doctrine] were applied “correctly” by a State acting alone, it
would be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to prove conclusively to
the other states using the watercourse that the first state’s utilization was
68. Id. at 489, 492.
69. Charles Manga Fombad, Consultation and Negotiation in the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 52 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2003).
70. Patricia K. Wouters et al., Sharing Transboundary Waters An Integrated Assessment of Equitable
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model 130 (IHP-VI Technical Document in Hydrology No. 74,
UNESCO
Working
Series
SC
2005/WS/13,
2005),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001397/139794e.pdf.
71. RONGXING GUO, TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ART OF AVOIDING
WAR 134 (2012).
72. Id.
73. RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 18 (Rev. ed., 1997).
74. Naho Mirumachi, Mark Zeitous & Jeroen Warner, Transboundary water interactions and the UN
Watercourses Convention, in THE UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT 352, 353 (Flavia Rocha Loures &
Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013).
75. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130.
76. Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change World: Challenges
and Opportunities for International Law and Policy 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 435 (2009).
77. Id. at 453.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

370

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2016

in fact “equitable” in relation to them. This consideration makes the involvement of a third party all the more important to the doctrine’s proper
and effective application.78
With the increasing scarcity of, and demand for, freshwater, the likelihood of
states being able to achieve such balance on their own diminishes even further, and
entrusting such determination to a third party may thus be required. Negotiation
should therefore be considered merely as the first step states should take to resolve
a TFD,79 since “working out their troubles on their own or shaking hands and getting
along may work occasionally, but most of the time the conflict will only be sent
underground to resurface later in more destructive ways.” 80 If negotiations fail or
if the parties are unable to enter into negotiations at all, other means of dispute settlement based on the involvement of a neutral third party should be considered. 81

B.

Third-Party Non-Binding Mechanisms

Considering the limits of bilateral negotiation, states may wish to involve third
parties in the resolution of their TFDs to assist them in reaching an amicable settlement. Non-binding third-party mechanisms such as mediation,82 conciliation,83
good offices,84 inquiry/fact-finding,85 etc., have been said to offer “flexible remedies” and “may involve more kinds of non-state actors” than both bilateral negotiation and judicial settlement.86 Therefore, these methods may be more suitable for
“providing concessions and reaching a compromise than direct negotiations.” 87
Such dispute resolution processes may be offered, for instance, by neutral states or
international organizations, as well as internal or external individuals. 88 An individual may have the advantage of acting more freely in the mediation process since
they would not be “encumbered by the world politics outside the dispute, which
usually affect states and official mediators.” 89 Generally, third-party intervention

78. Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses: Present Problems, Future Trends,
in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WOLFGANG E. BURHENNE 113, 115 (Alexandre Kiss & Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994).
79. Fombad, supra note 69, at 44-45.
80. GUO, supra note 71, at 135.
81. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130.
82. “Where a third party intervenes to reconcile the claims of the contending parties and to advance
his own proposals aimed at a mutually acceptable compromise solution.” U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL
AFFAIRS CODIFICATION DIVISION, HANDBOOK ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN
STATES, at 40, U.N. Sales No. E.92.V.7 (1992).
83. This process “combines the elements of both inquiry and mediation” by providing the parties with
“a better understanding of each other’s case by undertaking objective investigation and evaluation of all
aspects of the dispute and, on the other hand, provid[ing] them with an informal third-party machinery
for the negotiation and non-judicial appraisal of each other’s legal and other claims.” Id. at 45.
84. This process “seeks to encourage the parties to the dispute to resume negotiations, thus providing
them with a channel of communication.” Id. at 33.
85. The “investigation or elucidation of a disputed issue of fact.” Id. at 24, 26.
86. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357.
87. Salman M. A. Salman, Mediation of International Water Disputes - the Indus, the Jordan, and the
Nile Basins Interventions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES
360, 366 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Christina Leb & Mara Tignino eds., 2013).
88. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 130.
89. Salman, supra note 87, at 364.
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is more likely to be accepted by the parties when there is a stalemate or when other
options, particularly the military option, were tried and failed. 90
In the context of TFD resolution, the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention
(UNWC),91 the main international treaty governing the non-navigational uses of international waterways which entered into force in August 2014, provides for dispute
resolution by negotiation, failing which the parties “may jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by
them or agree to submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of
Justice.”92 If after six months the parties have not been able to settle their dispute
through such means, the Convention provides that the “dispute shall be submitted,
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding . . . unless
the parties otherwise agree.”93 Therefore, the UNWC includes a so-called “compulsory system of conciliation”94 through a default option of impartial fact-finding that
is intended to provide disputing parties with “recommendations . . . for an equitable
solution of the dispute, which the parties concerned shall consider in good faith.”95
However, such recommendations are not binding on the parties, nor is there a reference to international law principles in this mechanism. 96
Moreover, this dispute resolution provision of the UNWC was controversial
and the number of states that voted against it or abstained (including important
freshwater states such as India, China, France, Colombia, and Turkey) almost
equaled the number of votes in its favor.97 Some of the states abstaining claimed
that the dispute resolution provision did not go far enough in terms of compulsory
settlement.98 Indeed, several signatory states have declared themselves bound by
either International Court of Justice (ICJ) adjudication or arbitration for the resolution of disputes under the Convention, indicating both a need and a desire for more
robust mechanisms for the resolution of TFDs, at least on the part of some states. 99
Given the heavy reliance in TFDs on “expert recommendations concerning
technical matters, and the fact that all international water disputes are inevitably
90. Id. at 366.
91. G.A. Res. 51/229, annex, Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, (July 8, 1997), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/51/229.
92. Id. art. 33(2).
93. Id. art. 33(3).
94. Caflisch, supra note 17, at 244.
95. G.A. Res. 51/229, supra note 91, art. 33(8).
96. Caflisch, supra note 17, at 244-45.
97. Id. at 244.
98. Id.
99. Status of the Watercourses Convention, INT’L WATER LAW PROJECT, http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/watercourse_status.html (last updated July 31, 2015) (Hungary has declared itself “…bound by either of the two means for the settlement of disputes (International Court of
Justice, arbitration), reserving its right to agree on the competent body of jurisdiction, as the case may
be.” Montenegro has declared that: “in respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with Article
33 paragraph 2 of the said Convention, Montenegro recognizes as compulsory ipso facto, and without
special agreement in relationship to any party accepting the same obligation:
1.Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or
2.Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise
agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the annex to the present Convention.”
The Netherlands has declared that: “in accordance with paragraph 10 of Article 33 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, that it accepts both
means of dispute settlement referred to in that paragraph as compulsory in relation to any Party accepting
one or both means of dispute settlement.”).
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very fact-sensitive,”100 inquiry and fact-finding may be particularly useful in this
context. These mechanisms allow states to refer questions to a panel of experts for
impartial third-party investigation of factual or technical matters, and the International Law Commission (ILC) has opined that fact-finding or inquiry will frequently
resolve a TFD before any binding process is necessary. 101 Another similar mechanism that might prove useful in the context of TFDs is conciliation on the basis of
expert determination. A permanent or ad hoc joint institution created by the states
sharing the freshwater resource may carry out such expert determination, for instance. Such an institution would ideally include technical experts in addition to
legal experts, as the former tend to be in the best position to conduct fact-finding
regarding the watercourse that they were mandated to monitor, and constitute a forum for resolving disputes on a non-political level.102 In terms of the identity of
such experts, some suggest that all things being equal, an outsider has a greater
chance of succeeding since an insider may be part of the problem, may be perceived
as favoring one of the sides, and the parties may be hesitant to share confidential
information with such an insider.103
Ultimately, however, all third-party non-binding mechanisms suffer from a
common disadvantage that may hinder the effective resolution of TFDs. They all
produce a result that fails to “give expression to an affirmative endeavor to effect
accord between the states at variance” and therefore these states remain free to draw
their own, potentially divergent, conclusions as to the course to be followed.104 In
other words, the result these mechanisms produce may reflect the lowest common
denominator on which the disputing parties could agree rather than a definitive and
operative solution, and may lead to further conflict concerning their actual application in practice. This may in part explain why mediation of TFDs, for instance, has
had mixed success. While at least one such mediation, namely the World Bank
mediation of the Indus River dispute between India and Pakistan, was successful,
several other attempted mediations of TFDs were unsuccessful, such as the World
Bank’s attempt to mediate the Nile River dispute and the United States’ attempt to
mediate the Jordan River dispute. 105

III.

A NEW APPROACH TO INTERSTATE ARBITRATION

While both bilateral negotiation and third-party non-binding mechanisms have
their respective advantages, they lack an authoritative framework for compelling
participation and enforcing agreed-upon outcomes.106 In light of these limitations,
a procedure for the orderly investigation and resolution107 of disputes is required.
Moreover, the involvement of international judicial and quasi-judicial institutions
100. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357.
101. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 131.
102. Kristjánsdóttir, supra note 16, at 357-358; Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 131.
103. GUO, supra note 71, at 135-36.
104. Charles Cheney Hyde, The Place of Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation Treaties in the
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 105, 106 (Mary
Ellen O’Connell ed., 2003).
105. Salman, supra note 87, at 369-403.
106. Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication: Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era Of Climate Change, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 378 (2011).
107. Joseph Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of Internationally Shared Fresh Waters, 1
INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 264, 277 (2001).
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has been viewed as beneficial in cases of “regional or global environmental problems” and in cases of “local transboundary harm,”108 both of which may arise in
TFDs. Indeed, many water-related international instruments109 provide for the resolution of disputes by way of international adjudication, which has traditionally encompassed both judicial settlement and arbitration.110 In the context of TFDs, binding third-party resolution may in fact “be the only way out if all other means fail
and if the alternative is a stalemate that will result in an unnecessary prolongation
of international tension.”111 Nonetheless, states remain reluctant to submit TFDs to
a purely “legal” mechanism such as judicial settlement by the ICJ. 112 States are
similarly reluctant to use arbitration for the resolution of TFDs. 113 The underutilization of arbitration in this context may in part result from its conflation with judicial settlement and the failure of states to recognize it as an independent mechanism.114 Since “international law arbitration is...deeply enmeshed with adjudication”115 states tend to perceive both as purely legal mechanisms suitable only for
the resolution of questions of law through the application of legal principles, and
thus may view them as inappropriate in the context of complex disputes, such as
TFDs, that involve complex non-legal, political, or vital issues.
This perception, however, is misguided and flies in the face of the original purpose and true nature of interstate arbitration as a distinct dispute resolution mechanism that is substantively and procedurally different from judicial settlement. In
fact, arbitration “may naturally be a general alternative or complement to typically
judicial or quasi-judicial means”116 and may present the most suitable option for the

108. CATHRIN ZENGERLING, GREENING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL
BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS, TRIBUNALS, AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEES 77 (2013).

NGOS

109. See, e.g., Wouters, supra note 61, at 206 (discussing the 1961 Salzburg Resolution, art. 8 and the
1966 Helsinki Rules, art. XXXIV).
110. Spain, supra note 106, at 354.
111. Wouters et al., supra note 70, at 133.
112. The article focuses on the ICJ since it is the most relevant international forum for the adjudication
of TFDs. Other potentially relevant regional courts include the European Court of Justice, which may be
seized to resolve disputes concerning EU water law. Andrea M. Keessen et al., Transboundary river
basin management in Europe Legal instruments to comply with European water management obligations in case of transboundary water pollution and floods, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 35, 44-45 (2008).
113. One study indicates that out of 155 peaceful settlements attempts in shared river disputes between
1816-2001, only seven involved binding resolution by a third party. Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon,
Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 710, 723 (2011).
114. Other reasons may include the binding nature of the process, the lack of control over the outcome,
fear of unfavorable results, reluctance to give a dispute a high international profile, concerns about the
expense, inconvenience and delay involved in the proceedings, lack of familiarity with international
judicial procedures, and uncertainty regarding the enforceability of any eventual judgment,
MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 254; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Kelly M. Kaderaand & Mark J. C.
Crescenzi, Practicing Democratic Community Norms: Third-party Conflict Management and Successful
Settlements, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS 243 (Jacob
Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner eds., 2009); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 124
(2011).
115. Martins Paparinskis, Comment to For or Against International Arbitration: A Perspective of International Law of Dispute Settlement, EJIL: TALK!, (June 10, 2015, 15:24), http://www.ejiltalk.org/foror-against-international-arbitration-a-perspective-of-international-law-of-dispute-settlement/.
116. Paulo Canelas de Castro, Prospects for the Future of International Water Law: the View Projected
by the Epistemic Community, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 371, 408 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
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resolution of TFDs since it is “designed for just such occasions as those where parties prefer to settle their disputes privately and informally, in that it can be designed
for quick, practical and efficient resolution.” 117 This section therefore proposes a
new approach to interstate arbitration in the context of TFD resolution. The first
element of this approach calls for a return to the original purpose and true nature of
arbitration, which was not intended to constitute a strictly legal mechanism similar
to judicial settlement118 but was rather viewed as a more flexible, just, and diplomatic alternative to it. The second element sets out to revamp the Optional Rules
for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment
(Rules) of the PCA in this quasi-diplomatic spirit of arbitration.

A.

The “True Nature”119 of Interstate Arbitration

In the times of ancient Greece and China, arbitration was distinguished from
determinations by judges because an arbitrator could consider the equity of the case,
whereas a judge was bound by the letter of the law. 120 Such “equity” included
“every thing, which it is more proper to do than to omit, even beyond what is required by the express rules of justice.” 121 Compromissory clauses providing for
dispute resolution by arbitration were included in interstate treaties as far back as
418 B.C., when a treaty of peace between Sparta and Argos was concluded.122 Arbitration was used in those times to resolve a wide variety of interstate issues ranging from frontiers to breaches of peace by armed attack. 123 The use of interstate
arbitration continued during the Middle Ages, “offering the singular spectacle of
conciliation and peace advancing between populations of the most warlike character.”124 Arbitration was often resorted to not only to prevent wars but also to end
them by utilizing both its “legal” and “diplomatic” dimensions to reconcile the parties and re-establish peace125 in accordance with the rules of law and “in the most
useful and suitable way.”126
The modern era of interstate arbitration is commonly viewed as commencing
with the signing of the Jay Treaty of 1794 between Great Britain and the United
States, which was designed to resolve various disputes between the two countries
that threatened to result in war.127 With respect to three such disputes that were not
settled in the Treaty itself, including one concerning territory, it provided for resolution by a quasi-diplomatic arbitral process that combined legal proceedings and
diplomatic negotiations128 and retained many of the traditional two-dimensional
117. GUO, supra note 71, at 140.
118. Settlement by an international permanent court operating on the basis of predetermined procedural
rules and producing binding decisions based on the applicable rules of international law. Caflisch, supra
note 17, at 236; ZENGERLING, supra note 108, at 79.
119. Pinto, supra note 22, at 44.
120. M.C.W. Pinto, The Prospects for International Arbitration: Inter-State Disputes, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS 63, 65 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990).
121. Id.
122. JACKSON H. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO 157 (1929).
123. Id. at 158.
124. Id. at 176.
125. Id. at 181.
126. Id. at 180.
127. Pinto, supra note 120, at 66.
128. The commissions were comprised solely of the parties’ nationals, which some argue “encouraged
a high level of consensus-seeking.” Charles H. II. Brower, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and
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features of arbitration. For instance, in one of these disputes the parties were silent
regarding how the arbitration commission was to decide, and it based its decision
largely on equity and did not become too involved in the application of international
law.129 The remaining two disputes, moreover, were explicitly to be decided according to “justice, equity and the law of nations.”130
The successful settlements achieved by some of the arbitral commissions under
the Jay Treaty have largely been credited to their “spirit of negotiation and compromise”131 and to the arbitrators acting “as negotiators rather than as judges.” 132 While
they satisfied the legal dimension of the arbitral process by issuing reasoned awards
based on the application of legal principles, these commissions were considered to
work best where the subject-matter of the dispute allowed the commissioners to
give a measure of satisfaction to both sides since this permitted them to employ the
diplomatic dimension of arbitration in order to produce an effective and fair outcome.133 The success of these arbitrations, among others,134 resulted in a steady
increase in the number of interstate arbitration agreements during the nineteenth
century.135 These often instructed the arbitrators to decide “according to justice” or
“according to principles of justice and equity,” 136 thereby emphasizing their role as
“diplomats” rather than “judges.” Moreover, at a Conference of the Association for
the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations 137 in 1873 it was unanimously
agreed that arbitration was to be regarded “as a means essentially just and reasonable, and even obligatory on all nations, of terminating international differences
which cannot be settled by negotiation.” 138 At a later seating of the Conference,
while defining one of the objects of the Association as “the question of International
Law,” it was repeated that “the principal object, nevertheless, [was] to be Arbitration as a means of settlement of all differences between nations,” 139 whether involving legal or non-legal issues.
However, this rise in prominence of interstate arbitration was essentially an
“Atlantic movement” spearheaded by the states of Europe and America, and thus it
became greatly influenced by the European legal tradition and as a result gradually
evolved into a search for “orderly” dispute settlement through the application of law
and institutionalized “compulsory arbitration,” 140 culminating in the 1899 and 1907

Judicial Settlement Under Private and Public International Law 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 266,
270-271 (2008); KAJ HOBÉR, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3-4 (2005).
129. HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 4, 8.
130. Pinto, supra note 120, at 85; RALSTON, supra note 122, at 191-192; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 56.
131. Pinto, supra note 22, at 59.
132. Pinto, supra note 120, at 68 (quoting J.L. SIMPSON & H. FOX, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (1959)).
133. Id.
134. Such as the 1814 arbitrations between the United States and Great Britain under the Treaty of
Ghent and the 1871 Alabama claims Arbitration under the Treaty of Washington. Pinto, supra note 120,
at 72; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 13-18; Henry T. King Jr. & James D. Graham, Origins of Modern
International Arbitration 12 DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 46 (1996).
135. Pinto, supra note 120, at 69.
136. Id. at 85; HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 13.
137. The name of which was changed to the International Law Association in 1895.
138. Henry Richard, The Recent Progress of International Arbitration: A Paper, in ARBITRATION: TWO
VIEWS: THE RECENT PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (1971).
139. Id.
140. Pinto, supra note 120, at 70-72; Pinto, supra note 22, at 60.
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Hague Peace Conferences and the establishment of the PCA. 141 Thus began the
“judicialization”142 process of interstate arbitration, whereby international agreements require that arbitral decisions be based on international law, 143 and settlement
incorporating “diplomatic adjustment” is viewed as biased and fundamentally
flawed.144 The view that only such “judicial” arbitration based on law should be
“arbitration properly so called” quickly followed and has become the conventional
wisdom.145
This modern “judicialized” conception of interstate arbitration, however, while
perhaps introducing clarity and procedural order into its practice, arguably also deterred many states from using it in the context of complex interstate disputes that
are not amenable to resolution based solely on legal principles. 146 In addition, the
strong non-legal dimensions of most interstate disputes and the growing “dichotomy between international legality and justice” led to a period of decline in the use
of interstate arbitration in the 1930s.147 Therefore, “as the rules governing arbitration grew in comprehensiveness, completeness and legal precision, so did recourse
to arbitration as a means of resolving disputes decline.” 148 Interstate arbitration has
thus gradually transitioned from a mechanism that “emphasizes settlement of a dispute” to an essentially judicial mechanism that “emphasizes the application of law
to the dispute.”149 As a result, it has come to be treated by states with “wariness
and circumspection,”150 excluding from its purview any dispute that cannot be decided strictly on the basis of law. 151
It should be noted that, notwithstanding this decline in the use of interstate arbitration, since the 1970s it has gradually regained some of its credence with the
drafting of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules in 1976, the creation of the Iran-United States
Claim Tribunal in 1981, and the revival of the PCA during the 1990s and the first
decade of the twenty-first century.152 Indeed, the range of disputes involving states
that are submitted to arbitration nowadays is extremely broad, and includes disputes
concerning treaty interpretation,153 maritime and fisheries,154 trade,155 diplomatic
141. Even though the PCA remains an administrative institution that does not function as a traditional
court and does not have compulsory jurisdiction. Pinto, supra note 120, at 72-73.
142. “Judicialization” has been defined as “the spread of judicial decision-making outside the judicial
province proper.” Ole W. Pedersen, An International Environmental Court and International Legalism,
24 J. ENVTL. L. 548, 553 (2012).
143. Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 65, 68 (1997).
144. Pinto, supra note 22, at 60.
145. Id.
146. Pinto, supra note 120, at 74, 87.
147. Id. at 124.
148. Id. at 70, 87-88.
149. Pinto, supra note 22, at 60 (emphasis in the original).
150. Id.; Pinto, supra note 120, at 88.
151. Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FRONTIER DISPUTES 168, 193
(Evan Luard ed., 1970).
152. Howard M. Holtzmann, The Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Evolution of a Worldwide
Arbitration Culture, in INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 97, 103-104, 109 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000).
153. JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 38 (1999); Louise B. Sohn, The Role of Arbitration in Recent International Multilateral Treaties, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 171, 176-77 (1982-1983).
154. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 153, at 84.
155. Id. at 96-97.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/7

16

Meshel: The Evolution of Interstate Arbitration And The Peaceful Resoluti

No. 2]

Evolution of Interstate Arbitration

377

protection,156 and foreign investment.157 However, in most cases the issues submitted for resolution remain largely legal, and arbitrators tend to decide them as
“judges” on the basis of strict application of international law rather than on the
basis of “justice” or “equity,” thereby perpetuating the judicialized form of modern
interstate arbitration.158 As the distinction between arbitration and judicial settlement continues to fade, so does the prospect of states willingly arbitrating more
sensitive disputes.159
In order to revive the use of arbitration in the resolution of such sensitive interstate disputes such as TFDs it should be understood as the distinct, quasi-diplomatic
process it was originally intended to be, in which “dispassionate intermediaries
bring the facts of a dispute to light, evaluate rival claims based on their merits, and
make a judgment grounded in justice, equity, and respect for international law.”160
This perception of arbitration places it midway between judicial settlement and nonlegal mechanisms on the spectrum of interstate dispute resolution processes. Unlike
non-legal mechanisms such as negotiation or mediation, arbitration offers a final
and binding third-party resolution, which is likely to be perceived as more legitimate by the parties and is especially effective where they have failed, or are unlikely, to reach a consensual agreement.161 In TFDs in particular, domestic political
conditions or the national value attributed to a disputed water resource may prevent
leaders from making voluntary concessions in negotiation or mediation, which may
then result in deadlock and stalemate. 162 Therefore, a process conducted by an impartial third party that “assure[s] to the disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned argument” 163 and that results in a binding decision that
is subject to a “standard of rationality that is different from that imposed on the
results of an exchange,”164 may in some cases present the only feasible way to settle
a TFD. While judicial settlement by the ICJ also offers final and binding third-party
dispute resolution, it should be distinguished from arbitration in at least three fundamental respects: its purpose, the nature of the process, and its effectiveness.

i.

Purpose

Unlike adjudication by the ICJ, arbitration is intended to be carried out by tribunals with no continued existence, tasked solely with resolving the particular dispute before them. As a result, complex matters such as prestige, symbolic value,
historical antipathies, and competition of power, which are prominent in many
TFDs, are likely to be better addressed in arbitration than in judicial settlement by

156. GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES
349-50 (2012).
157. Brower, supra note 128, at 292.
158. HOBÉR, supra note 128, at 55.
159. BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS 432 (Andrew Clapham ed., 7th ed. 2012).
160. Gregory A. Raymond, Demosthenes and Democracies: Regime-types and Arbitration Outcomes,
22 INT’L INTERACTIONS 1, 2 (1996).
161. Todd Allee & Paul Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 219 (2006).
162. Id. at 221.
163. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365 (1978).
164. Id. at 367.
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a permanent court.165 While it cannot be denied that there are some advantages to
a permanent judicial body that can facilitate the “homogeneous development” of
international water law through uniform interpretations of principles and consistent
judgments,166 the limited applicability of international legal principles to regionspecific and highly technical-scientific TFDs arguably renders such development a
secondary objective to the effective and practical resolution of these disputes. This
is so since TFDs are complex and cross-disciplinary problems in which “a focus on
legal solutions . . . is likely to prove insufficient” 167 and “practical justice” that focuses on feasible outcomes and resolves the dispute on the ground, rather than
merely proclaims the parties’ respective legal rights and obligations, should be preferred. Such justice is more likely to be achieved in arbitration since rather than
deciding which party is legally right or wrong, it operates to achieve a negotiated
settlement.168

ii.

Nature of the process

Unlike the largely fixed composition of the ICJ,169 in arbitration state parties
are free to choose their decision makers. 170 This allows them to appoint arbitrators
with specific non-legal expertise, or who are familiar with the particular dispute and
the parties’ interests, which is likely to inspire greater confidence in the arbitral
tribunal.171 This ability is particularly significant in TFDs, which unlike disputes in
other areas of international law, often include technical aspects that must be entrusted to experts and increasingly require broad, interdisciplinary technical
skills.172 It has therefore been said that “the inclusion and understanding of technical information in the decision-making process can only serve to achieve more
balanced, scientifically based, and thoughtful decisions.” 173 While the ICJ did include at one point a Specialized Chamber for Environmental Matters, which might
have been more suitable for the resolution of TFDs, it has never been used and has

165. Heiko Fürst, The Hungarian-Slovakian Conflict Over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams: An Analysis, 6 INTERMARIUM, 2003, at 6.
166. Eckard Rehbinder & Demetrio Loperena, Legal Protection of Environmental Rights: The Role
and Experience of the International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation, 31 ENVTL.
POL’Y & L. 282, 285 (2001).
167. Pedersen, supra note 142, at 556.
168. Fombad, supra note 69, at 53.
169. Francisco Orrego Vicuña & Christopher Pinto, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: PROSPECTS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, REVISED REPORT PREPARED FOR THE CENTENNIAL OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE 290-291 (2000). A party to an ICJ case that does not have a judge
of its nationality on the bench, however, may appoint an ad hoc judge to sit for the duration of the case,
ICJ statute, Art. 31(3). RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 7-8 (2010); Howard M. Holtzmann, Some Reflections on the Nature of Arbitration, in THE
FLAME REKINDLED: NEW HOPES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 67, 73 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs
eds., 1994).
170. D.H.N. Johnson, International Arbitration Back in Favour? 34 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 305, 306-307
(1980); Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution in Inter-State Litigation: When States Go To
Arbitration Rather Than Adjudication 5 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 133, 141 (2006).
171. Johnson, supra note 170, at 312.
172. Caflisch, supra note 17, at 236.
173. Gabriel E. Eckstein &Yoram Eckstein, International Water Law, Groundwater Resources and the
Danube Dam Case, in GAMBLING WITH GROUNDWATER – PHYSICAL, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF AQUIFER-STREAM RELATIONS 243, 247 (John Van Barahana et al. eds., 1998).
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not been reconstituted since 2006.174 The failure of the Specialized Chamber was
largely due to the fact that it retained most of the structural and procedural shortcomings of the ICJ - it did not provide a process that was more expedient, cheaper,
or less formal than the full Court and the appointed judges did not have a wider
knowledge of international environmental law. 175 Furthermore, even though the
ICJ may appoint experts to assist it in deciding TFDs, it has not done so in previous
disputes and has been criticized for failing to deal with scientific uncertainty in a
progressive manner through deeper interaction with the experts, thereby missing
“an opportunity to established itself as a careful and systematic court that can be
entrusted with complex scientific evidence in the resolution of international disputes.”176
In addition to selecting their decision-makers, state parties retain considerable
control over the course of the arbitral process since they can design their own arbitration agreement and decide on the procedural and substantive rules to be applied
by the tribunal.177 They can also determine the rules under which scientific and
technical evidence will be examined and treated, rather than be subject to the prescribed rules of a particular judicial forum. 178 As already noted, the role of technical
and scientific data in TFD resolution is significant, and the ICJ is arguably ill
equipped to evaluate and incorporate such data in its decision-making. In the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,179 for instance, the ICJ rendered its decision without
evaluating either the effects of the disputed measure on the region’s environment,
or the data concerning the amount and quality of water required to maintain a balanced natural and human environment. 180
Furthermore, arbitration, where properly understood, involves a more contextual and broad interpretation and application of non-legal or equitable principles,181
which is particularly advantageous to the resolution of TFDs in light of the controversial state of international water law and since the resolution of such disputes may
depend as much upon the balancing of competing interests as upon the ascertainment and application of legal rules.182 Arbitration assigns to law a “basic but by no
means exclusive function,”183 and arbitrators are therefore not as concerned with

174. ZENGERLING, supra note 108, at 173-74; TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 362 (2009).
175. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The International Court of Justice and Environmental Disputes, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 17, 54 (Duncan French et al. eds., 2010).
176. Al-Khasawneh, supra note 18, at 355-56. See also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.),
Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 108, 117 (Apr. 20 2010) (joint dissenting opinion by Khasawneh, J. and
Simma, J.).
177. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 83, 89-91 (5th ed. 2011); Fox, supra note
151, at 170-71.
178. Philippe Sands, Concluding Remarks, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES 417,
422-24 (Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2003).
179. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
180. Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and International Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 246 (2003).
181. The ICJ, on the other hand, would arguably turn to equity only when a decision is not possible on
legal grounds. M. Lachs, Arbitration and International Adjudication, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
PAST AND PROSPECTS 37, 41 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990).
182. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 1981 Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION 103, 115.
183. Pinto, supra note 22, at 49.
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stating the law and settling the dispute by strict application of legal rules 184 as they
are with reconciling national interests, easing tensions, encouraging lasting co-operation, and achieving an acceptable settlement. 185
This is of particular importance where a dispute involves more than strictly
legal questions, as is the case in many TFDs, and where equitable considerations
form the basis for determining rights and obligations also under applicable legal
principles.186 Since in TFDs the facts and circumstances of each dispute, rather than
any a priori rule, will ultimately be the determinants of the rights and obligations
of the parties,187 the mechanism selected for their resolution should be able to effectively account for non-legal issues and guarantee states a fair and practical solution. Ultimately, international law must play a role in the resolution of TFDs, but
this should not necessarily be a leading role. As one scholar has noted, “international law in itself does not provide solutions for conflicts of water uses” but “there
is no answer to water problems without international law.” 188 The quasi-diplomatic
true nature of arbitration is arguably best suited for balancing legal and non-legal
considerations and ensuring that local norms or practices and changing circumstances that are not reflected in the principles of international water law are properly
taken into account in the resolution of TFDs.189

iii.

Effectiveness

Unlike the zero-sum nature of judicial settlement, which emanates from its
rigid procedures and adherence to legal rules, arbitration is better able to produce a
compromise solution that avoids a winner-takes-all outcome190 and is therefore
more likely to generate among disputing parties a sense of having been treated
fairly.191 This may make the process appear less risky for states engulfed in disputes
involving political or vital interests, which in turn may improve the prospects of
successful implementation of arbitral decisions. 192 Such compromise solutions are
particularly important in TFDs, where cooperation and coexistence among states
should arguably take precedence over pronouncement of their legal rights.193 Arbitral awards are also more likely to be complied with by states since they exert “legal,
moral and diplomatic force.”194 This is so not only because states prefer to avoid
184. Jean-Pierre Queneudec, The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: Its Contribution to International Law, in
THE ERITREA-YEMEN ARBITRATION AWARDS 1998 AND 1999 1, 5-6 (Bette Shifman ed., 2005).
185. Pinto, supra note 22, at 49-50.
186. Johnson, supra note 170, at 311. It should be noted that the ICJ has been increasingly prepared to
hear politically charged disputes and “depoliticize” them by separating the legal aspects of the case from
the political. However, this arguably risks neglecting a party’s non-legal interests, which may result in
the rejection of judicial decisions by losing parties. MERRILLS, supra note 177, at 155-156.
187. MCCAFFREY, supra note 14, at 365.
188. Laruence Boisson de Chazournes, Elements of a Legal Strategy for Managing International Watercourses: The Aral Sea Basin, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: ENHANCING COOPERATION AND
MANAGING CONFLICT 65, 67 (Salman M.A. Salman & Laruence Boisson de Chazournes eds., 1998).
189. ISLAM, supra note 49, at 4-5.
190. MERRILLS, supra note 177, at 291; Lachs, supra note 181, at 41.
191. Lachs, supra note 181, at 41.
192. MERRILLS, supra note 177, at 291.
193. ISLAM, supra note 49, at 372.
194. Malintoppi, supra note 170, at 159; Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 195, 200
(I. William Zartman ed., 2007). While ICJ judgments can be enforced through recourse to the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 94 of the UN Charter, this mechanism has never been used.
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the political and reputational costs of non-compliance,195 but mainly because state
parties become personally invested in the arbitral process by controlling the issues
submitted for resolution, the procedural and substantive rules governing the process, and the identity of the arbitrators.196
This “true nature” of arbitration therefore enables it to provide a “genuine alternative method of dispute settlement.” 197 The extent of party control over the
arbitral proceedings, coupled with the possibility of having non-jurists render binding decisions on the basis of extra-legal considerations and in accordance with the
particular circumstances of the case, distinguish interstate arbitration both from
non-binding mechanisms and from judicial settlement by a permanent international
court.198 Unfortunately, interstate arbitration has lost this original quality in its
modern form as a result of the prevalent misconception that arbitration and judicial
settlement represent a “distinction without a difference.”199

B.

The PCA and TFDs

The second element in the proposed approach to interstate arbitration in the
resolution of TFDs sets out to revamp the Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes
Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment (Rules) of the PCA. Established in 1899, “the PCA is an intergovernmental organization tasked with facilitating arbitration and other modes of dispute resolution between states, state entities,
intergovernmental organizations, and private parties.” 200 While it does not operate
as a permanent international arbitral body, it does have a permanent institutional
basis and the PCA secretariat receives requests for arbitration, assists in the selection of arbitrators, facilitates the conduct of arbitrations, and promotes the services
offered by the court to potential litigants.201
In 2001, the PCA adopted the Rules, which seek to “address the principal lacunae in environmental dispute resolution.”202 The Rules are based on the 1976
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules “but were modified to reflect the unique characteristics of disputes relating to natural resources, conservation or environmental protection.”203 The Rules are optional in that they can only be used pursuant to the agreement of the parties when a specific dispute arises, unless they were incorporated by
reference in an environmental agreement.204 Despite being designed specifically
195. MERRILLS, supra note 177, at 114, 293; Beth A. Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 829, 835 (2002);
JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND
MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, at 27 (2004).
196. Nejib Jibril, The Binding Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme - Making States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial Bodies 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 633, 668 (2004).
197. Pinto, supra note 120, at 86-87; Aman Mahray McHugh, Resolving International Boundary Disputes in Africa: A Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOWARD L.J. 209, 239 (2005).
198. Raymond, supra note 160, at 3.
199. Pinto, supra note 120, at 87.
200. Judith Levine, Information About the Activities of the Permanents Court of Arbitration in Environmental Disputes in the Context of Energy Projects 1 (Sept. 2014), http://voldgiftsinstituttet.dk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/levine_-_pca_environment__26_energy_activities.pdf.
201. STEPHENS, supra note 174, at 30.
202. Environmental Dispute Resolution, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage03fd.html?pag_id=1058 (last visited Dec. 12, 2016).
203. Levine, supra note 200, at 6.
204. STEPHENS, supra note 174, at 31-32.
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for disputes concerning environmental issues, the Rules have been scarcely employed by states to resolve environmental disputes, and have not been used at all in
the context of transboundary freshwater disputes. There have only been six cases
commenced under the Rules; four concerned Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements and two concerned contractual agreements relating to emission reductions
projects.205 In three of these cases, moreover, both parties were private entities, in
one case the respondent was a public limited company, in one case the respondent
was a private entity wholly owned by a public limited company, and in one case the
respondent was a government agency.206 The Rules have been included in one multilateral instrument that concerns water issues,207 but have yet to be employed in the
resolution of TFDs.208 Nonetheless, the Rules do offer several advantages in this
context.
First, they provide procedural rules that can expedite the arbitral process and
prevent deadlock where, for instance, the parties cannot decide on the arbitrators or
the procedure for their appointment.209 Moreover, the Rules include specific provisions for multiparty disputes, which can facilitate the participation of multiple states
in the resolution of TFDs,210 as well as provisions for the resolution of disputes that
do not reference an applicable treaty or convention, 211 which is particularly useful
in TFDs where the allocation or use of water is not set out in an agreement. Another
advantage of the Rules is that they combine the benefits of a permanent and wellrespected administrative institution, on the one hand, and an ad-hoc process, on the
other hand. The main benefit of an existing body is that it already benefits from the
support of states.212 Establishing a new permanent water court or tribunal would
only “add a further layer of institutional complexity to the patchwork of jurisdictions already operating in the environmental field, with all the implications this carries both for increased jurisdictional competition and conflict, and for the possible
fragmentation of international law.”213 Moreover, while a permanent forum with
compulsory jurisdiction may be desirable in some respects, there appears to be little
appetite in the international community for such a forum in the environmental context,214 and even less so in the context of TFDs. As for the benefits of an ad hoc
process, one of the reasons for the success of arbitration in environmental disputes
205. JUDITH LEVINE & NICOLA PEART, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION (“PCA”), INFORMATION
ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION IN DISPUTES RELATING TO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND/OR NATURAL RESOURCES (2015).
206. Id.
207. 2003 Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, art. 14 (Kiev, May 21, 2003), (https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/civil-liability/documents/protocol_e.pdf).
208. Levine, supra note 200, at 6.
209. LEVINE & PEART, supra note 205.
210. Although the Rules “do not empower the appointing authority to appoint all arbitrators when multiple claimants or respondents fail to make a joint appointment. Such a provision, if desirable to the
parties, may be added to the arbitration agreement.” PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note
24, at 184.
211. Matthew Vespa, An Alternative to an International Environmental Court? The PCA’s Optional
Arbitration Rules for Natural Resources and/or the Environment, 2 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. &
TRIBUNALS 295, 312 (2003).
212. STEPHENS, supra note 174, at 60.
213. Id. at 61.
214. Id. at 62.
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is that “most of them have taken place on an ad hoc basis….” 215 Moreover, the
record of state compliance has been said to be “far more mixed when environmental
litigation is commenced unilaterally on the basis of compulsory procedures.” 216
Therefore, the PCA and the Rules provide disputing states with the benefits of a
prescribed yet flexible procedure as well as institutional support, and can therefore
be useful in the resolution of TFDs. However, they should be “sensitized” 217 and
adapted to this specific context.
For instance, the Rules currently presume that the arbitral proceedings will be
confidential, unless the parties agree otherwise.218 This has been criticized for running against the prevailing trend in both domestic and international environmental
law to open environmental decision-making processes to public scrutiny and participation. It may also be seen as problematic in the TFD context since transparency
is essential for ensuring that arbitrators remain accountable to the international community in deciding such disputes in accordance with prevailing environmental
standards and values.219 However, some degree of confidentiality may also facilitate the resolution of TFDs by way of arbitration since it would protect information
impacting national security220 and would allow states to obtain a binding decision
in a process that is more in line with the quasi-diplomatic true nature of arbitration.
Still, the strict presumption in favor of confidentiality should be relaxed in the TFD
context, for instance by requiring that the final award be made public. Keeping
arbitral awards confidential “lags behind the practice of public international law”
and particularly in TFDs that affect interests beyond those of the parties to the arbitration, a potential lack of award publication can leave parties without access to the
arbitral proceedings further disenfranchised.221 Moreover, since the established
practice of other international courts and tribunals, such as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, and the judicial bodies operating under the WTO
and ICSID systems, is to publish decisions, it is unlikely that states would be deterred from using the Rules if they included a similar provision.222
In terms of composition and powers of the arbitrators, the Rules could provide
that unless the parties agree otherwise arbitral tribunals shall include at least one
relevant scientist or technical expert, rather than rely on expert witnesses that have
no decision-making authority.223 The Rules could also expressly authorize arbitral

215. Id. at 34.
216. Id.
217. PEDERSEN, supra note 142, at 557.
218. The Rules provide for proceedings to be held in camera, PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
supra note 24, at 197, art 25.4, and for the award to be confidential unless the parties agree otherwise.
Id. at 201, art. 32.6. Also, a party can request information classified as confidential within the arbitration.
Id. at 193, art. 15.4.
219. STEPHENS, supra note 174, at 33-34; Vespa, supra note 211, at 310. See also, ARMIN VON
BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME?: A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 157-206 (2014).
220. Vespa, supra note 211, at 320.
221. Id. at 319.
222. Id.
223. Francesca Romanin Jacur, Remarks on the Role of Ex Curia Scientific Experts in International
Environmental Disputes, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
452 (Nerina Boschiero et al. eds., 2013). The Rules currently provide for the establishment of Specialized
Panels pursuant to a specialized list of arbitrators “considered to have expertise in the subject-matters of
the dispute at hand for which these Rules have been designed,” PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION,
supra note 24, at 190, art. 8.3, however they do not require the appointment of such arbitrators. Also,
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tribunals to reach compromise solutions by considering all relevant circumstances,
including non-legal factors. For instance, the Rules could provide that arbitral tribunals shall decide on the basis of “respect for” international law 224 as well as hydrological, geographical, economic, political, and cultural considerations that may
be relevant in the particular case.225 This would serve to acknowledge that “the job
of arbitrators . . . should be to arrive at politically viable compromises rather than
simply ‘legally correct’ decisions.” 226
Furthermore, the Rules currently allow for disputes involving parties other than
states, including international organizations and private parties,227 but they do not
address the issue of the participation of non-State actors as amicus curiae in interstate disputes.228 Since resolving TFDs requires assessing the full range of issues,
needs, interests, and demands of the relevant parties and addressing those most affected by the outcome, the Rules should explicitly allow for the participation of
relevant non-state actors as amicus curiae with leave of the arbitral tribunal.229 Relevant NGOs, for instance, “might bring to the attention of the parties and the [arbitral tribunal] . . . legal arguments and factual information that is not known to them
or not brought forward by the parties because it does not serve their interests.”230
In TFDs, in particular, “[i]ncreased participation by diverse actors reshapes the discourse from legal rights over sovereignty and territory to interest-based problem
solving”231 and can ensure that local customs and practices of water-use and sharing
are taken into account in the arbitral decision-making. This, in turn, “ensures the
availability of culturally and contextually appropriate practices” and creates a flexible system capable of adapting to new circumstances and avoiding undue constraint
imposed by legal precedents that are detached from the reality on the ground. 232
States should also be explicitly allowed to include non-state actors in their delegations in hearings before arbitral tribunals, and tribunals should be authorized to consider unsolicited submissions by non-state entities.233 Even if documents provided
in arbitral proceedings are not accessible to the general public they should arguably
be made available to selected relevant NGOs. 234 Such NGOs could be selected
through an accreditation system that would filter the organizations that are allowed

persons with scientific and technical expertise are suggested as experts rather than arbitrators. Id. at 199,
art. 27.5.
224. As was provided in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
225. See generally Eva Kleingeld, Third Party Involvement in Fostering Transboundary Cooperation
in
Central
Asia,
GLOBAL
WATER
P’SHIP,
http://www.gwp.org/en/ToolBox/CASESTUDIES/Asia/Third-party-involvement-in-fostering-transboundary-cooperation-in-Central-Asia-471/
(last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (a recent case study on the water conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
concerning the construction of the Rogun dam has concluded that “political and cultural factors play a
significant role” in water conflicts and should therefore be considered by third-party interveners.)
226. Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute Settlement Technique 23 VA. J. ‘INT’L L. 1, 4 (1982).
227. PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION, supra note 24, at 183-844; STEPHENS, supra note 174, at
255.
228. ZENGERLING, supra note 108, at 256.
229. Id. at 193, 216, 232.
230. Id. at 217.
231. Spain, supra note 106, at 376-77.
232. Id. at 377.
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to contribute to and participated in arbitral proceedings and set out rules governing
access.235

IV.

CONCLUSION

Interstate arbitration was originally conceived as a sensitive, albeit law-oriented mechanism, but has been gradually transformed into a system of “high legal
refinement” that is functionally assimilated with judicial settlement. 236 It has thus
become “an engine of adjudication indistinguishable from its judicial counterpart.”237 This perception of arbitration, however, is detrimental to the peaceful resolution of complex interstate disputes such as TFDs since judicial settlement may
prove “unhelpful, irrelevant, overly adversarial, and simply too abstract”238 in this
context. Moreover, international water law as currently formulated is arguably inadequate, in and of itself, as a tool for the resolution of TFDs and states therefore
tend to avoid what they perceive to be “legal” dispute resolution mechanisms. At
the same time, bilateral negotiation and third-party non-binding mechanisms may
also prove inadequate for the resolution of TFDs. It is precisely in these intractable
cases that the original and true nature of arbitration should be revived so that it may
serve as an effective dispute resolution alternative in which “arbitrators can dispense with legal formalities and may apply whatever procedural rules and substantive law best fit a case.”239 Used in this way, arbitration is able to account for both
legal and non-legal considerations, adapt to the particular circumstances of the dispute, and provide maximum control to the state parties while producing a binding
decision that avoids deadlock.
This Article does not suggest that there are no advantages to purely diplomatic
or strictly legal dispute resolution mechanisms, or combinations of these. 240 Neither
does it claim that arbitration is a panacea for all TFDs, or that it does not require
states’ good faith and political will to make peace rather than wage war, as do all
interstate dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, the choice of the means to be
used in the resolution of TFDs largely depends on the nature of the case to be decided and on the approach of the disputing states.241 Rather, this Article is intended,
first, to serve as a reminder of arbitration’s original purpose and its potential to
provide “mediatory decisions, exempt from the strict norms of the law of nations”
and thereby resolve “the Gordian knot of non-legal disputes.”242 Second, it offers
a practical way for doing so by revamping the PCA Rules. Ultimately, it is only
through a comprehensive consideration of the relevant legal and policy issues, as
235. Id. at 224-25 (such rules were developed, for instance, by the WTO Appellate Body in the Asbestos
case).
236. Pinto, supra note 120, at 65.
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eds., 1993).
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well as the underlying science involved 243 that states will be able to resolve their
TFDs effectively and in such a way that the disputed resource suffices for present
needs and preserved for future generations,244 and such consideration is best undertaken in arbitration.

243. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 180, at 258.
244. Gabriel Eckstein, Application of International Water Law to Transboundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute Over Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 67, 99 (1995).
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